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On Being Morally Expendable
Inevitably,
assessing
the moral
value of life seems to leave us stuck
between a rock and a hard place.
If
we hold that life is intrinsically valua
ble, that commits us to respecting
plants and paramecia as ends in them
selves and to explaining how the
change from organic to inorganic is in
and of itself a moral loss. That evalu
ation seems exaggerated, and who
knows how even to begin to explain
the intrinsic moral superiority of the
organic to the inorganic!
On the
other hand, if life is valuable only as
a necessary condition for other, mor
ally significant goods, such as happi
ness or conscientious action, it follows
that the taking of life is morally sig
nificant only where it affects the
amou nt of or opportu n ities for these
goods.
This conclusion is objection
able because it seems to leave the
individual's life morally insignificant
and unprotected: as long as he will be
replaced by an (at least) equally
happy
or
conscientious
individual
when he is killed, it would seem to be
morally indifferent whether he
is
allowed to continue his life or whether
he is killed and replaced.
Since I agree that the rock is a
rock--that is, I know of no reason to
believe that the organic· is in and of
itself morally more valuable than the
inorganic--the point of this paper will
be to show that the hard place is
softer than it looks.
To do this I
want, first, briefly to indicate how
limited the practical consequences of
the
replaceability
argument
are. 1
Then, on the theoretical side, I want
to show that the replaceability argu
ment does not work from all standard,
general moral viewpoi nts and that an
argument recently put forward by
Peter Singer, among others, to the

effect that utilitarians must accept the
replaceabil ity argument is fallacious.
Thus, the point of this paper is not
to prove that the replaceability argu
ment commits some logical blunder', for
it does not; rather, the main point of
this paper is that the replaceability
argument requi res certai n presump
tions concerning moral worth, that not
all credible, general moral viewpoints
make the required assumptions, and
that there are even credible forms of
utilitarianism which do not make the
requi red assumptions.
Consequently,
even if we agree that life is morally
valuable only as a necessary condition
for other goods, we are not stuck
with the replaceability argument.
Fi rst of a II, even those of us who
work in the clouds should be aware
that just about the only current, rou
ti ne ki lIing of an imals wh ich the
replaceability argument would even be
relevant to justifying is that involved
in the taking of some animals bred,
raised, and more or less relea::;ed to
be game animals.
The replar~eability
argument cannot be used to justify
the killing of wild animals,. because by
and large (i) they would have existed
whether or not we had an interest in
killing them, (ii) we do not do any
thing to replace the ones we kill, and
(iii) it is not necessary that the wild
animals we kill die in order that the
ones which replace them might live.
Nor can the replaceability argument be
used to justify the killing of most
domesticated animals or animals bred
and raised in captivity, e. g., for lab
oratory use. This is because most of
these animals do not lead a life worth
living. Even when not in pain, most
animals raised for slaughter or bred
for laboratory use
lead frustrated,
boring lives which fall far short of
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the quality of life which gives being
alive its moral value.
Consequently,
although the replaceability argument
provides an intriguing puzzle for
moral philosophers to ponder, it is of
little to no consequence as a justifica
tion for our current treatment of ani
mals.
Turning to the puzzle, its solution
depends on two things: what is the
good that gives moral value to life,
and what is the relation of individual
ity to that good?2 Rather than try to
resolve long-standing moral disputes
in order to answer the first of these
questions, I propose simply to layout
six more or less standard answers to
that question.
I shall then consider
how important or unimportant individ
uality is from each of these six moral
viewpoints.
The first two of these viewpoints
concern autonomy and the belief that
autonomy merits our respect.
Kant
argued that autonomous individuals
should be treated as ends in them
selves because autonomy is a neces
sary condition for the possibility of
morality. 3 The idea here is that since
morality is intrinsically good,
the
source of morality should be respected
as an intrinsic good.
So, as long as
an individual capable of right and
wrong is innocent of crime, he has
earned our unqualified respect.
The second autonomy-based moral
viewpoint I wish to consider is of
more \'ecent vintage and is summarized
in ths popular slogan "we don't have
a ri3ht to force our values onto oth
ers. " The idea here is that if an
individual is capable of valuing things
for himself, then he should be allowed
to do so and to pursue his own values
(as long as doing so is not unfairly
injurious
to
other
independent
valuers).
This idea of autonomy,
i.e., being an independent source of
evaluations, differs from the Kantian
concflption of autonomy as the ability
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to recognize moral values.
That independent valuers should be
respected has been a fundamental
presumption of many natural rights
and egoistic moral philosophies, and it
has become particularly important in
recent work in medical ethics, where
it
underlies
many arguments
for
patients' rights.
This moral outlook
was also adopted by Tom Regan in a
recent argument concerning animal
rights:
.
The suggestion before us,
then, is that all but the i rre
versibly comatose have inher
ent value because all these
humans have a life which is of
more or less positive or neg
ative value for them, and this
logically
independently
of
whether they (the humans in
question) are valued by anyone
else.
Here,
therefore,
we
have a way of illuminating why
it would be wrong to treat
these humans
merely as a
means.
This would be wrong
because
it
would
fail
to
acknowledge and respect the
fact that they are the subjects
of a life whose value is logic
ally independent of any other
being's taking an interest in
it.
Thus, in treating these
humans merely as means one
treats them as if their value
was
logically
dependent on
their answering to the needs,
purposes,
etc.,
of others,
when in fact, they, as the
subjects of a more or less good
life, have value that is logic
ally independent of their being
valued as a means by anyone
else. 4
I have yet to see a convincing defense
of the idea that because an individual
is capable of making his own evalua
tions we ought to permit him to do
so--although some defense in terms of
the "do only that which you can will
as a universal law" form of the
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categorical imperative seems possible
but its wide acceptance in current
moral philosophy, both professional
and popular, seems beyond question. s

I. shall label the fi rst of these
autonomy-based moral outlooks "the
Kantian-autonomy view" and the sec
ond variety "the independent-valuer
. "
view.
The remaining four moral outlooks
on what gives life value are all forms
of utilitarianism. I propose, following
Peter Singer here, to divide utilitari
anism into classical vs. preference
theories and total view vs.
prior
existence theories. 6 Classical utilita
rianism commands us to do that which
will maximize happiness, while prefer
ence utilitarianism commands us to do
that which will accord, as far as pos
sible, with the preferences of those to
be affected by ou r action. These two
forms of utilitarianism are different
because individuals may not (e.g.,
due to ignorance) prefer that which
would maximize happiness and because
one may prefer something (e.g., life)
the loss of which would not occasion
unpleasant feelings.
The total view
form of utilitarianism commands us to
maximize the amount of utilitarian good
in the world, while the prior existence
view commands us to maximize that
good for the beings already in the
world. The difference between these
two forms of utilitarianism is that the
former, but not the latter, requi res
direct concern for the preferences or
happiness of unborn individuals or
generations.
On the prior existence
view, the futu re interests of the
unborn may have to be taken into
account, but only insofar as the pros
pect of thei r fu Ifi IIment or fru stration
affects the preferences or happiness
of
cu rrently
existing
individuals.
Combining these two distinctions
yields four versions of utilitarianism:
the preference-total view, the prefer
ence-prior
existence
view,
the
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classical-prior existence view, and the
classical-total view.
Now, how does individuality fare
when measured by these six different
ways of establishing moral value?
From the Kantian-autonomy perspec
tive, the only forms of life which
merit our moral respect are those
which are capable of moral action, and
individuals with this capacity merit
our respect so long as they are inno
cent of cr.ime. The Kantian imperative
to treat no man as a means merely is
not a command to maximize the· number
of conscientious agents in the world;
rather, it asserts that those with the
capacity for recognizing and doing
right and wrong (and who are in no
cent of wrong) thereby merit ou r
respect.
In the case of individuals
who have had the opportunity to do
wrong but have not done so--which is
the paradigm case here--this expres
sion of good moral cha racter may be
said to have "earned" these individu
als our respect.
Just as a hard
worker has earned his wage, so some
one of good moral character has
earned the right to be happy, and in
this world, at least, others must
respect the moral individual's desires,
wants, needs, etc., and his attempts
to fulfill them, if he is to achieve the
happiness to which he is entitled.
Among these needs (as fa r as we
know), is the need to be alive in
order to experience happiness.
So,
although killing one individal of good
moral character (or with the capacity
for it) and replacing him with another
(e. g.,
slaying one normal
human
infant and replacing it with another)
would not reduce the amount of
(capacity for) good moral character in
the world, it would deprive the slain
individual of what he is due on the
basis of his (capacity for) good moral
character. Thus, the Kantian-Cluton
omy view protects the
individual
against the replaceability argument
because it commands us to respect the
right to happiness of those with the
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capacity to recognize and act
values, while slaying such an
ual would (for all we know)
him of that to which he is

on moral
individ
deprive
entitled.

It may be thought that all this is
irrelevant to the matter at hand, the
moral permissibility of killing and
replacing non-human animals, since
Kant held that only those who can act
from a sense of duty can have good
moral character, that only rational
beings can act from a sense of duty,
and that only humans are rational ani
mals. While this is true of Immanuel
Kant, it need not be true of the Kan
tian-autonomy position. Some philoso
phers, such as David Hume, have
argued that some non-human animals
are rational, and others, such as
Richard Watson, have argued that
some non-human animals are capable of
acting out of a sense of duty 7. Fu r
thermore, one can combine the view
that individuals of good moral charac
ter have earned our respect with
non-Kantian theories of good moral
character, e.g., Hume's idea of virtue
arising from a strong sense of sympa
thy.
I believe most people, philoso
phers included, would reject Kant's
claim that acting from a sense of duty
is the only morally estimable motive.
Most of us credit generous sentiments
as' a morally worthy motive. However,
acknowledging the moral significance
of sympathy and other generous sen
timents opens the door wide to argu
ing that many non-human animals who
intentionally and sincerely do morally
good deeds, or who a re at least in no
cent of crime,
have earned ou r
respect for their lives on Kantian-au
tonomy
grounds. 8
Consequently,
these animals could not be killed and
replaced, according to the Kantian
autonomy view.
Turning to the independent valuer
view, it holds that we should respect
all individuals capable of forming their
own values.
There are two points
that need to be clarified in order to

discuss this position: what counts as
making one's own values, and, correl
atively, how are we to tell if others
are (capable of) doing this? Some phi
losophers, such as Ruth Cigman in
her recent article, "Death, Misfor
tune, and Species Inequality," make
of valuing a fairly abstract, inten
tional, conceptual process of which
preference behavior does not provide
significant evidence:
To be a possible subject of
misfortunes
which
are
not
merely unpleasant experiences,
one must be able to desi re and
value certain
things.
The
kind of misfortune which is in
question here is death, and to
discover whether this is a mis
fortune for an animal, we must
ask whether, or in what sense,
animals don't want to die. Of
course, in some sense this is
true of virtually all animals,
which manifest acute fear when
thei r
lives
are th reatened.
Yet blindly clinging on to life
is not the same as wanting to
live because one values life.
This is the kind of desire for
life of which persons are capa
ble.
It is this which gives
sense to the claim that death is
a misfortune, even a tragedy,
for a person. 8
For philosophers like Cigman, linguis
tic ability is necessary both for being
able to rna ke one's own evaluations
and for communicating to others that
one has this capacity.
This position has the virtue of
avoiding the opposite extreme of say
ing that plants which turn their
leaves to follow the sun are making
their own evaluations and showing this
to us. However, it seems arbitrary to
cut off valuing at some fairly intellec
tual level.
Infants, children, ·and
many animals seem obviously capable
of being happy or unhappy and to
prefer, want, desire, grab for, pur
sue, or "value" those things which
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bring them the former. Also, we can
usually tell what infants, children,
and animals want without being told;
we need only to watch their course of
action. Thus, our everyday dealings
with infants, children, and animals
suggest that being a sentient agent,
rather than having linguistic ability,
is what is necessary for being (and
for being recognized as being) an
independent eval uator.
The bu rden
of pl"oof is on those who would deny
this conclusion--and that burden can
not be met by a stipulative definition.
It follows from the independent
evaluator viewpoint that we should
(other things being equal) respect the
values and pursuits of all sentient
agents.
Since they cannot pursue
their values unless they are alive and
since another, replacement individual
would pursue his own values, rather
than those of the individual
he·
replaces, it also follows that the inde
pendent evaluator view protects many
animals
against
the
replaceability
argument. Let me emphasize that the
individual need not directly value life
itself (whatever that may mean) in
order to have his life protected by
the independent evaluator view. What
individual X values is not, for exam
ple, just lying in the sun. What he
values is his lying in the sun--this
may be clearly evidenced by his chas
ing away other individuals already
lying in the sun, so that he may take
their place. Individual Y, brought in
to replace the slain X, will not, of
course, value X's lying in the sun; he
will value his own (Y's) lying in the
sun. So, replacing X with Y will not
provide an adequate foundation for
the continued pursuit of what X val
ued, even where X did not directly
value his own life. Consequently, for
a sentient agent's values and pursuits
to be respected, his life must be
respected, whether or not he ever
contemplates that life and values it
directly.
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Thus, both autonomy-based moral
viewpoints deny that it is morally
permissible (in many cases) to kill an
animal and replace it with a similar
animal.
Either such
killing
and
replacing would deny the animal of
good moral character the respect it
has earned, or it would deny the sen
tient agent the respect due the pu r
suit of his independe·nt values.
Turning to the utilitarian options,
the preference-total view option main
tains that we should do that which
will accord (as far as possible) with
the preferences of those cu rrently
alive and the likely preferences of
futu re individuals and generations.
Here, once again, we must deal with
the psychological and epistemological
issues of what counts as having a
preference (or being capable of hav
ing preferences) and how we are to
know when others have preferences
(or are capable of having prefer
ences) .
As valuing has sometimes been
made out to be an intellectual activity,
so preferring is sometimes made out to
be an activity requiring self-contem
plation and the projection and analysis
of futu re alternatives.
For example,
Peter Singer writes:
A being which cannot see itself
as an entity with a future can
not have a preference about its
own future existence. This is
not to deny that such a being
might struggle against a situ
ation in which its life is in
danger, as a fish struggles to
get free of the barbed hook in
its mouth; but this indicates
no more than a preference for
the cessation of a state of
affai rs that is perceived as
painful or th reatening. Strug
gle against danger and pain
does not suggest that the fish
is capable of preferring its
own future existence to non
existence. 10
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Immediately, one may wonder how a
being that cannot see itself as a being
with a future could possibly perceive
a state of affairs to be "threatening"
or could possibly struggle against
"danger".
Singer's attempt both to
acknowledge obvious value expressing
behaviors of an imals yet to deny that
they have preferences seems to be
self-contradictory.

will be able to get out of the house.
Self-consciou s/ non -self-conscious and
aware of the future/unaware of the
future are not in the same set with
pregnant/not pregnant;
there are
various forms and degrees of self
consciousness and awareness of the
future, and these varieties give rise
to varying capabilities for having
preferences.

Fu rthermore, desi ri ng seems to be
a paradigm of preferring, 11 yet desir
ing requires neither reflective self
consciousness nor great intellectual
ability. 12
Furthermore, it would be
reasonable to expect that all sentient
beings, no matter how limited their
self-con scious ness,
intellect,
and
sense of time, would have prefer
ences. There would be no evolution
ary point to their being sentient if
they could not recognize, desire, and
pursue those things which give them
pleasure and recognize,
desire to
avoid, and seek to avoid those things
which give them pain.

Again, when it is denied that ani
mals can have a preference for life, it
is
presumed that
to prefer
life
requires contemplating an indefinite
future existence.
But why should
"preferring" X require that we con
template X when the question of X is
not raised by the environment? Can
not one "prefer" X and show others
that he prefers X if, whenever his
environment raises the issue of X, he
pursues X (other things being equal)?
It does not seem to do harm to the
logic of "preferring" to say that an
animal who acts to preserve his life
when it is threatened prefers to
remain al ive and is amply demonstrat
ing his preference.
Many animals
even seem to experience and deal with
the conflict of desires which some
philosophers might want to insist is
essential to the logic of "preferri ng";
e. g., when faced with danger to thei r
young or group, many animals seem
both to want to flee and to feel they
must stay and defend their young or
group.
Perhaps humans are the only
animals ·who are morbid enough to
contemplate life and death when that
issue is not forced upon them, but
preferring life to death does not
require such morbid fascination. Just
as was the case with self-conscious
ness and a sense of the future, pre
ferring comes in a variety of forms
and degrees, and it is arbitrary to
consider only the intellectual extreme
of that variety when making moral
judgments.

When it is maintained that few, if
any, animals can have preferences,
because they cannot see themselves as
entities with a future, it is presumed
that self-consciousness and having a
sense of the future are confined to
self-contemplation and to having a
sense of the indefinite expanse of time
awaiting us. However, in addition to
self-contemplation, there is the sen
sory self-consciousness involved in
feeling pleasure and pain and the
practical consciousness of oneself as
an agent in the world, having a "lived
body" of powers at his command,
needs to be met, and vulnerabilities to
be protected. 13
Being .an agent also
requires
having a
sense of the
future--which,
let us
not forget,
though it may extend indefinitely,
begins immediately.
This is because
agency requires recognizing that one
thing will lead to another, e.g., that
jf one goes to the back of the house
and pushes on the pet door, then he

When trying to figure out what will
best accord with the preferences of
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those who will likely be affected by
ou r action, we must recogn ize that
many
animals
are,
like children,
desiring, sentient agents,
even if
they
are
not
self-contemplative
beings.
Their behavior can make
their desires known to us, and among
these desires will ordinarily be a
desire not to be killed. Also, even if
the animal is not aware that his long
term existence is required to fulfill
some of his desires, e.g., the raising
of his young, his remaining alive for
a long period of time may be neces
sary for fulfilling those preferences;
consequently, doing what accords with
those preferences req u ires respecti ng
the animal's life. Furthermore, among
the animal's current desires will ordi
narily be a number which are essen
tially self-centered, e.g., his contin
uing to lie in the sun, which will
remain frustrated even if the animal
were replaced by another an imal with
similar preferences. Thus, the killing
of a non-self-contemplative animal and
replaci ng it with another is a morally
significant act from the preference-to
tal view utilitarian viewpoint.
Whether such killing and replacing
is morally permissible remains u nde
cided, however, and that is true
whether we are dealing with animals
or with humans.
The self-contem
plative individual does have an advan
tage, for he may prefer not to worry
about his being slain and replaced
while his demise is still a long way
off,
whereas
the
non-self-contem
plative individual can have no such
worry; he can on Iy prefer not to be
killed, and that only when the time of
slaughter is close at hand.
However,
if the possibility of long-range fore
knowledge of slaughter could be elimi
nated, merely a technological problem
which some science fiction writers
have al ready resolved, then the per
missibility of slaughter and replace
ment would be the same for both
humans and animals on preference-to
tal view util ita rian g rou nds. 14
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Whether
or
not
long-range
foreknowledge is involved, the direct
moral significance of killing humans or
animals is that it will frustrate some
of their preferences. However, if the
slain are replaced, their demise will
also permit the fulfillment of the pref
erences of the replacement individuals
(which would, by hypothesis, not be
possible without the slaughter of the
others).
It follows (neglecting indi
rect issues) that if individuals were
slaughtered when half the preferences
that could be fulfilled in their lives
have been fulfilled and were replaced
with individuals having similar life
expectancies, that would accord with
the preferences of the born and the
unborn just as well as allowing the
original individuals to live out the
second half of their lives. 15 Also, if
the number of an individual's prefer
ences that cou Id be satisfied ina year
was the same throughout his life, then
slaughter and replacement at any time
in his life would be permissible, and
if the number of possible fulfillments
were higher in earlier years than in
later years, it would even be prefera
ble to slaughter an older individual
and replace him with a younger one,
rather than allowing the old individual
to live out his life.
Thus, if we
could compute the rate of fulfillment
of preferences, preference-total view
utilitarianism
could
sanction
the
slaughter and replacement of animals
and humans.
Moving on, we may deal with both
the preference-prior existence and the
classical-prior existence forms of util
itarianism at one stroke.
Both of
these views limit direct moral concern
to currently existing individuals, the
former to according with their prefer
ences, the latter to maximizing their
happiness. This clearly rules out the
replaceability argument. That argu
ment presumes that the future prefer
ences or happi ness of the unborn can
be used as a substitute for the losses
suffered
by
the slain;
however,
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insisting that our direct moral obliga
tions are limited to currently existing
individuals denies direct moral signifi
cance to the future preferences and
happiness
of
the
unborn
and,
thereby, denies that the latter can be
morally equated with the former. So,
any prior existence moral outlook will
protect the individual against the
replaceability argument.
Turning to classical-total view util
itarianism, it requires us to do that
which will maximize the amount of
happiness in the world.
From this
viewpoint, killing, even painlessly, is
a morally significant act, for it elimi
nates the possibility of the future
happiness of the slain (assuming that
the futu re held happiness for the
slain individual and that death does
not lead to a happier form of exis
tence than
continuing
life
would
have) ~ However, if another individual
with simila r prospects for the futu re
is substituted for the slain individual
(and would be brought into existence
only if the other were slain), then the
balance of happiness in the world is
unaffected. Consequently,
classical
total view utilitarianism provides moral
significance for life but does not pro
vide any protection for the individual
against the replaceability argument.
The individual is merely a receptacle
for happiness; so, as long as there is
a ready supply of receptacles to
replace the broken ones,
nothing
important will be lost through the
breakage.
Once again, this conclusion applies
to humans as well as to animals.
If
humans are not distressed by fore
knowledge of their impending slaugh
ter and replaclement (because the
practice is hidden from them) or if
they have al ready enjoyed half the
happiness thei r lives cou Id provide or
if happiness in later years is suffi
ciently less than in earlier years to
counterbalance the depression caused
by knowing that one is to be slain
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and replaced by a youngster, then
classical-total view utilitarianism could
not only permit but even require the
slaughter and replacement of humans.
Since humans have greater ability to
foresee their slaughter and replace
ment than do animals, there would be
greater
technological
problems
in
applying the replaceability argument
to humans than to animals. However,
humans' extensive foresight provides
no more fu ndamental an obstacle to
slaughter and replacement on classi
cal-total view utilitarian grounds than
does the limited foresight of animals.
The only differences here are the
details of implementation.
Once it has been argued, as it was
above, that animals have preferences,
it can be seen that the difference
between preference and classical forms
of utilitarianism is not important where
the question is the permissibility of
slaughter and replacement.
Whether
one is dealing with humans or animals
and with happiness or preferences,
the crucial issue is whether a total
view or a prior existence view will be
adopted.
This conclusion naturally
leads to the question, if we are going
to be utilitarians, is there some rea
son wh ich impels us to be total view
rather than prior existence utilitari
ans?
That total view utilitarianism
could, while prior existence utilitari
anism could not, sanction the slaugh
ter and replacement of humans would,
in the eyes of most people, philoso
phers included, put the burden of
proof on the shoulders of the total
view.
Also, as Peter Singer points
out, total view utilitarianism has the
counterintuitive consequence that it
requires us to bring as many happy
individuals into the world as possible.
It follows that a couple whose happi
ness· (or preferences) wou Id be com
promised by a smaller amou nt than the
happiness (or fulfilled preferences)
awaiting a child they could have would
be under a moral obligation to have
that
child. 16
Prior
existence
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utilitarianism leads to no such conse
quence.
However, Peter Singer also argues
that
prior
existence
utilitarianism
leads to another, equally counterintui
tive conclusion:
How do we square prior exis
tence utilitarianism . with our
i ntu itions about the case when
a couple are considering hav
i ng
a ch i1d
who,
perh aps
because it will inherit a genetic
defect, would
lead a thor
oughly miserable life and die
before its second birthday?
We would think it wrong for a
couple knowingly to conceive
such a child. 17
Singer goes on to provide the follow
ing resolution for this problem but
also indicates that he finds this ans
wer ins ufficient:
Perhaps the best one can
say--and it is not very good-is
that there is nothing directly
wrong in conceiving a child
who will be miserable, but once
such a child exists, since its
life can contain nothing but
misery, we would reduce the
amount of pain in the world by
an act of euthanasia.
But
euthanasia is a more harrowing
process for the pa rents and
others involved than non-con
ception.
Hence we have an
indirect reason for not con
ceiving a child bound to have
a miserable existence. 18
I would agree that this indirect
wrong answer does not provide an
adequate response to the problem
Singer has raised for prior existence
utilitarianism.
However, I think the
following can be added to provide an
adequate response to this problem.
Regarding the matter of our intuitions
concerning this case, I am not sure
we have any, for this is an utterly
fantastic case. Cases somewhat Ii ke it
do occu r, but they a re cases where
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there IS a statistically significant
chance that a couple's infant will
inherit a debilitating disease or defect
and, of course, a statistically signifi
cant chance that it will not.
I n these
cases I do not find there is a well-es
tablished intuition that it would be
wrong for couples to consider con
ceiving children, especially if they
were prepared to abort a fetus dis
covered to have in herited the debili
tating disease or defect.
Similarly,
we encou nter cases of people whose
children will likely (or even almost
certainly) inherit their defects, e.g.,
retardation or blindness, and will,
consequently, be condemned to leading
a life we would not find satisfying.
However, those people may fi nd that
life satisfying and, consequently, feel
they are not bringing misery into the
world by having children.
Again, it
is not intuitively obvious they are
wrong.
In contrast to such real cases,
Singer's case verges on being incon
ceivable.
Somehow, the couple must
know with virtual certainty that their
prospective child will inherit a disease
which will make its life undeniably
miserable and kill it before the age of
two.
Fu rthermore, th is couple must
be so desperate to conceive thei r own
child, that they would rather bring
this monstrosity into the world· and
care for it 19 than adopt a child.
I
doubt that such people and such a
case exist, and I do not think that
the acceptability of moral principles
hinges on their ability or inability to
handle such unheard of cases.

But if such people did exist, they
would have a perverted idea of repro
ducing and parenting and would show,
by keeping the child alive for its two
miserable years, their willingness to
use others merely as means to their
own happi ness.
Consequently, th is
whole project of
parenting
would
express a kind of demented character
which would give the project a strong
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immoral value.
I think this bad-char
acter evaluation accounts for one idea
that,
presume, Singer intended to
suggest with this case, viz., that
there would be something demented,
perverse, selfish, or morally insensi
tive involved in bringing a miserable
child into the world or even in just
seriously
contemplating
doing
so.
Prior
existence
utilitarianism
can
account for this intuition, since this
is an evaluation of character, and
prior existence utilitarianism no more
precludes making character evaluations
than does total view utilitarianism.
I n discussing bringing a miserable
child into the world, it is easy to
lump together th ree stages of the
process which a re importantly differ
ent in their moral value:
(i) intending to conceive such a
child,
(ii) conceiVing such a child, and
(iii) keeping such a child alive.
As just discussed, (i) is a bizarre
project and expresses bad moral char
acter,
if the prospective
parents
intend to keep the child alive.
If,
however, they intend to abort the
potentially miserable child before it
develops sufficiently to suffer, then
thei r intention is to satisfy· thei r
bizarre compulsion to conceive in a
way which does no direct harm from
any utilitarian viewpoint.
Far from
being wrong, such a project would be
morally praiseworthy, for it (a) shows
tolerance for unusual psychological
needs, (b) expresses, in its willing
ness to sacrifice the pre-sentient
fetus, a commitment to the idea that it
is not species membersh ip but the
capacity to feel pleasure and pain (or
to have preferences) which makes a
being morally significant in itself, and
(c) reponsibly projects a course of
action which will satisfy the bizarre
needs of the couple without causing
. harm to or frustrating the preferences
of anyone else.
Thus, on utilitarian
grounds, "considering having a miser
able child" is not obviously wrong,
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and prior existence utilitarianism can
acommodate the character evaluations
which are involved in morally evaluat
i ng (i).
Turning to (ii), if we set aside the
pleasure involved and issues such as
rape, it is morally neutral. There is
nothing directly either morally right
or morally wrong with conceiving a
child which,
if it is allowed to
develop, will lead a thoroughly miser
able life.
Conceiving such a child
could be wrong for the indirect rea
sons Singer notes, i.e., aborting the
pre-sentient fetus could be more dis
tu rbi ng for the couple (and others,
too, perhaps) than not conceiving at
all, but conceiving such a child could
also be morally justifiable if the suf-,
feri ng associated with. abortion were
less than the frustration of not con
ceiving or if, as suggested above, the
production of such a fetus were nec
essary for medical progress.
Addi
tionally, conceivi ng a potentially mis
erable child is like the moderate use
of alcohol or other potentially debili
tating drugs: by itself it is either
morally innocuous or morally positive,
due to the immediate satisfaction it
provides; it becomes morally objec
tionable only if it is allowed to lead to
consequences
whose disval ue
out
weighs that immediate satisfaction. As
long as one takes steps to insure that
these adverse consequences will not
occur, there is nothing directly wr~>ng
with such indulgences in the poten
tially harmful.
Finally, allowing a thoroughly and
incurably miserable child to continue
to suffer seems clearly immoral. Only
the possibility of thereby making a
great contribution to easing the suf
fering of others would justify keeping
such a child alive.
Satisfying the
compulsion of the parents to have a
living product of their own loins pales
by comparison with the misery of such
an infant.
However, prior existence
utilitarianism
has
no
problem

68

accounting for this evaluation of (iii),
for at this stage the suffering child is
So, at
an existing, sentient being.
the stage where we intuitively feel
that a wrong is being done to the
suffering child, prior existence utili
tarianims also finds that, ceteris pari
bus, having, i.e., keeping, such a
chi Idis w ro n g .
Considering having a child who will
be miserable if it is allowed to live
and even conceiVing such a child do
not bring misery into the world. Mis
ery is brought into the world only
when that ch i Id has developed to the
point where it can suffer and when it
is allowed to continue to live and suf
fer.
I think Singer believes his case
poses a problem for prior existence
utilitarianism because he does not
clearly distinguish intention, concep
tion, and maintenance and, conse
quentiy, transfers the intuitively neg
ative moral evaluation of the third of
these stages back to the earlier two
stages.
However, once we clea rly
distingu ish these th ree stages, we can
see that this case does not pose a
problem for prior existence utilitarian
ism, since "bringing a miserable life
into the world" refers to actualizing
(or allowing to start operating) the
capacity to suffer of an already exist
ing
individual.
The
difference
between bringing a miserable life into
the world and bringing misery into a
life seems to be limited to the fact
that in the latter case the individual's
capacity to feel pleasure and pain (or
to have fulfilled or frustrated prefer
ences) has already been operating for
a while, while in the former case we
are considering its initial actualiza
tion.
Since in either case the indi
vidual already exists, this difference
does not constitute a difficulty for
prior existence utilitarianism.
Finally, Singer maintains that to be
satisfactory, prior existence utilitari
anism would have to explain the fol
lowing asymmetry:
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if the pleasure a possible child
will have is not a reason for
bringing it into the world, why
is the pain a possible child will
experience a reason against
bringing it into the world?
The prior existence view must
explain the asymmetry between
cases of possible children who
are likely to have pleasant
lives,
and possible children
who are likely to have misera
20
ble lives. 2D
However, there is no need for such
an explanation, for there is no asym
metry here.
The possible happy life
of a normal child and the possible
miserable life of a deformed child
become reasons for
having,
i. e.,
keeping, the normal child and not
having, i.e., aborting, the deformed
child only when the child is already in
existence and its capacity for happi
ness or misery is ready to be actual
ized. At that stage the obligation to
keep the normal child is as strong (on
either classical or preference utilita
rian grounds) as the obligation to
abort the deformed ch ild.
Simiia rly,
seriously considering conceiving and
maintaining an
assuredly miserable
child is ordinarily an expression of
bad moral character, while seriously
considering conceiving and maintaining
a
normal
child
is
ordinarily an
expression of good, i. e., responsible,
generous,
or
loving,
character. 21
The actual conceiving of either child
is, of course, in itself just pleasant
(ceteris paribus). So, at each stage
there is symmetry in our evaluations
concerning parenting a normal child
and parenting a miserable one.
I
would guess that Singer believes there
is an asymmetry here because he is
comparing our obligation (given cur
rent liberal intuitions) to abort an
already existing, though not yet sen
tient, seriously deformed ch i Id with
our lack of obligation (again, given
cu rrent liberal intuitions) to conceive
normal children.
But once again, if
clearly
distinguish
intention,
we
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conception, and maintenance, the sup
posed obstacle to accepting prior
existence
utilitarianism
disappears.
To sum up this discussion of Sing
er's objection to prior existence utilit
arianism, first, that objection is based
on a fantastic possibility, and it is at
least not obvious that the fate of
moral theories hinges on their ability
or inability to handle the fantastic.
Second, what would be demented or
perverse in the project of pa renti ng
Singer describes is the character of
the prospective parents, and prior
existence utilitarianism has no more
difficulty making character evaluations
than does total view utilitarianism.
Third, if we clearly distinguish the
three stages of the project--consider
ing having a miserable child, conceiv
ing such a child, and keeping the
child--it becomes clear that there is a
definite, direct, moral wrong only at
the third stage, but since the child
already exists at that stage, prior
existence utilitarianism has no diffi
culty accounting for that wrong.
Finally, prior existence utilitarianism
does not require any asymmetry in the
criteria employed in determining our
obligations concerning having or not
having normal or miserable children.
Thus, Singer's challenge to prior
existence utilitarianism has been met.
(And the strategy employed here does
not suggest that a similar response to
his challenge to total view utilitarian
ism could be made--here there is an
asymmetry. )
There is one other objection to
prior existence utilitarianism which
might be raised, namely, that it wou Id
rule out obligations to futu re genera
tion s.
One cou Id, of cou rse, have
obi igations to respect how cu rrently
existing people (and animals?) feel
about the Iife prospects of futu re
generations, but since they do not
exist, we could not have direct obli
gations to them. This might seem a
serious problem, for the idea of ou r
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obligations to futu re generations seems
to be a fai rly common one and has
achieved some currency in environ
mental ethics.
Nonetheless, I thin k
the prior existence view is correct:
we do not have obligations to future
generations.
And recognizing this
need not pose an obstacle for the
development of an effective envi ron
mental ethics.
On any given day, our obligation
to do that which will maximize the
long-range happiness or accord with
the long- range preferences of those
currently alive commits us to looking
seventy-five to one hundred years
into the future. 22 I doubt that we
are capable of making significant pro
jections of use patterns, preferences,
technological developments, and other
important
matters
concerning
the
quality of life more than seventy-five
to one hundred years into the future.
So, if we insure that our environmen
tally significant practices will not lead
us (humans and animals) to be dissat
isfied with the quality of life available
to us seventy-five to one h u nd red
years hence, I think we will be doing
the best we can.
Also, let us not
forget that every time a decision must
be made about maintaining, altering,
or abandoning a program, that deci
sion wou Id have to be based on a
consideration of what would be best
for the seventy-five to one hundred
years stretching into the future from
that date.
Consequently, foregoing
the idea of direct obligations to future
generations would not cripple environ
mental ethics.
To summarize, four of the six
moral theories considered here extend
moral value to life in a way which
protects individual humans and animals
from the replaceability argument. The
on Iy moral theories considered here
which provide no such protection are
the two forms of total view utilitarian
ism.
However, total view utilitarian
ism would sanction the replaceability
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of humans, as well as of animals, and
would obligate us to have as many
children and to breed as many animals
as the ea rth can support without
diminishing the over-all happiness (or
fulfillment) in the world.
The other
fou r moral theories considered here do
not encounter these difficulties.
So,
if these other theories do not fall
prey to other, more serious difficul
ties--and we have seen that some pro
posed objections to prior existence
utilitarianism fail--there would seem to
be ample, animal-independent reason
for even utilitarians to reject total
view utilitarianism, thereby undercut
ting
the
replaceability
argument.
Therefore, from a theoretical, as well
as
a
practical,
perspective,
the
replaceability argument does not pose
a serious obstacle to the development
of animal rights and other attempts to
improve the moral status and the lives
of animals.
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replaced, at or after death, by
another animal in the case of
wh ich conditions (a) and (b)
hold.
(It is to be understood, of course,
that if there are differences of degree
among lives which are on balance
worth living, then the life of the life
of the replacement animal is to be of a
least as high a degree as that of the
animal it replaces.)
2
By "individuality" I do not mean
anything having to do with the qual
ity, natu re, or complexity of different
personalities or characters.
I mean
simply the "thisness," as Duns Scotus
called it, wh ich quantitatively sepa
rates us as different beings.

Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the
of Morals, trans. Lewis
White Beck (I ndianapolis: The Library
of Liberal Arts, 1959), pp. 46-47
3

Metaphysics

4
Tom Regan, "An Examination and
Defense of One Argument Concerning
Animal
Rights,"
Inquiry
22/1 &2
(1979),
pp.
208-209.
T.
L.
S.
Sprigge also uses this argument to
advocate animal rights in his essay
"Metaphysics, Physicalism, and Animal
Rights," Inquiry 22/1 &2 (1979), pp.
101-143.

Notes
Notes�
By "the replaceability argument,"
I understand the formu lation of it
found in the March, 1982, issue of
Ethics 8- Animals (111/1, p. 1) :
It is permissible, ceteris pari
bus, to use an animal and to
kill it (for food or research or
anything else) provided that
the following conditions are
met.
(a) the life of the animal is
on balance a life worth live,
(b) the animal otherwise
would have no life at all
(would not exist), and
(c)
the animal
will
be

5
Regan's "illumination" of why it is
wrong to treat independent valuers
merely as means is vitiated by his
uncritically lumping acknowledging and
respecti ng that independence- -a su r
prising lapse from a philosopher who
is usually meticulous in drawing and
observing distinctions.
If I guard,
chain, or cage slaves or animals to
keep them from escaping my control, I
thereby acknowledge that they place a
different value on their lives and con
ditions than I do.
I even "respect"
thei r val ues in the pragmatic way one
"respects" the power of and danger
posed by an adversa ry, although I do
not "respect" their evaluations of
thei r Iives and conditions in the moral
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sense of the term; that is, I do not
honor those evaluations, treat them as
a basis for rights, consider them to
constitute justified claims to something
and against me, or feel duty bound
not to
interfere with
responsible
attempts to fulfill those values. Such
lack of moral respect does not commit
the faux pas of denying what these
individuals in fact are, i.e., indepen
dent valuers; it merely indicates that
I am willing to deny these individuals
the satisfaction of their desires,
needs, wants, etc., in order to sat
isfy my own.
So, Regan's analysis
does not show why this attitude
towards others is morally objection
able.
Peter Singer,
Practical Ethics
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press, 1979), Chapters 4 and 5.

6

7
David Hume, A Treatise of Human
Nature, Part III, Section xvi, and
Richard A. Watson, "Consciousness
and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals
and Natu re," Environmental Ethics 1/2
(1979).

S. F. Sapontzis, "Are Animals
Moral Beings?," American Philosophical
Quarterly 17/1 (1980).
8

Philosophy & Public Affairs
( 1981), p. 57.

9

10

Practical

Ethics,

p.

10/1

81.

11
Of course, one may desire some
thing yet prefer that it not happen,
as when one's desires conflict with his
moral commitments.
However, failing
such conflicts, to desire X is to pre
fer that it occu r. We wou Id suspect
that some stipulative definition is at
work, if we hea rd someone say some
thing like "I desire X and feel no
conflicting desires or values, yet I do
not prefer that X occu r. "

12
In Interests and Rights (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1980), R. G. Frey

contends that desiring requires lin
guistic ability, for (i) desiring X
requires believing that we do not cur
rently have X and that having X
would improve our condtion and (ii)
believing requires linguistic ability
because
[in] expressions of the form
. ," what
"He believes that
follows the "that" is a sentence
and what the "he" in question
bel ieves is that that sentence
is true (87)
and
sentences are the sorts of
things which
I and others
regard as capable of being
true and false (89).
However, that sentences and beliefs
a re both capable of bei ng true or
false no more establishes a dependence
of the latter on the former than the
fact that automobiles and evening
gowns can both be red establishes
that the latter require the former.
Similarly, that the object of a belief
statement is a sentence no more
establishes that the object of a belief
is a sentence than the fact that the
object of vision is expressed by a
word in "I saw John"
john" establishes that
the object of perception is a word.
When I am th i rsty, the object of my
desire and of my beliefs about what I
lack and what would improve my con
dition is something to drink, not a
sentence about something to drink.
No amount of grammatical analysis will
change that. And an analysis of how
we talk about interests, desires, and
beliefs is no substitute for an analysis
of interests,
desires,
and beliefs
themselves, which is why Frey's book
fails to show that animals lack inter
ests, desires, or beliefs because of
thei r lack of linguistic ability.
jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcen
Jean-Paul
dence of the Ego (New York: The
Noonday Press, 1957), and Maurice
Merleau - Ponty, Phenomenology of Per
ception (New York: Humanities Press,
1962) .
13
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14

In. "Singer on Killing and the
Preference for Life" (Inquiry 22/1 &2
(1979), pp. 157-170), Michael Lock
Lockwood also questions whether prefer
preference utilitarianism draws a significant
distinction between humans and ani
animals in regard to the morality of kill
killing and replacing them.

The only faintly realistic possiblity of
th is I can image is where the aborted
fetus would be crucial for research
toward curing the debilitating disease
or birth defect.
However, in that
case, far from doing wrong, the
couple could be considered self-sacri
self-sacrificing, even heroic.

Something like Bentham's catego
categories for measuring pleasures, e.g.,
intensity, du ration, and extent, wou ld
have to be devised for measuring
preferences, since not all preferences
are equally preferred.

20

15

16

17

Practical Ethics, pp. 86-87.
I bid.,

p.

21
This is not to say that not con
considering or considering not having
normal
children
is
ordinarily
an
expression of bad moral character- -al
-although, contrary to Singer's intui
intuitions, that would be a fairly tradi
traditional evaluation.

87.
The seventy-five year figure is
close to correct if we use average
human life expectancy as our basis;
the one hundred year figure is cor
correct if we use the normal maximum
human life expectancy as our basis,
since every human generation seems to
produce some centena rians. What the
correct figures
would
be
if we
included animals, as we should, in
figuring the average or normal maxi
maximum life expectancy, I do not know.
22

18

Ibid.,

pp. 87-88.

If the child is not allowed to
develop to the point where it will
experience pain or other miseries,
then there is no harm.
However, it
is even harder to conceive of people
who are so desperate to conceive a
child that they would do so knowing
full well that the fetus will be aborted
before the end of the fi rst trimester.
19

Practical Ethics, p. 87.

